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FUEL TURBINE TEMPERATURE REDLINE
SENSOR RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
SENSOR FAILURE DATA - FUEL SIDE ONLY
PART NUMBER 7004-91 7013 TOTAL
TOTAL SECONDS 264,000 158,000 422,000
FAILURES 3 2 5
BOTH PART NUMBERS EXHIBIT THE SAME FAILURE RATE
MISSION RELIABILITY VALUES - SINGLE SENSOR (50%CONFIDENCE)
FAILURE (HIGH OR LOW)
FAIL HIGH - DISQUALIFY
FAIL HIGH - VOTE FOR CUTOFF
FAIL LOW DISQUALIFY
0.993104
0.9943159
0.9967419
0.9979538
HISTORICAL SSME RELIABILITY DATA
SINGLE ENGINE - 104% MISSION
EXCEED FUEL TURBINE REDLINE
0.9924918
0.9984938
ERRONEOUS SHUTDOWN PROBABILITY
FIRST FAILURE HIGH OR LOW (I OF 2)
SECOND FAILURE HIGH AND VOTE
COMBINED
THREE ENGINE PROBABILITY
MTBF
0.0137444
0.0032581
4.478E-05
0.0001343
7,440
LOSS OF PROTECTION PROBABILITY
FIRST FAILURE HIGH OR LOW (I OF 2)
SECOND FAILURE - NO VOTE
COMBINED
THREE ENGINE PROBABILITY
MTBF
0.0137444
0.0056841
7.812E-05
0.0002344
4,270
REDLINE EXCEEDED PROBABILITY
SINGLE ENGINE 0.0015062
THREE ENGINE PROBABILITY 0.0045117
MTBF 220
REDLINE PROVIDES NEEDED PROTECTION
SAFE SHUT DOWN FOR 20 PERCENT OF HISTORICAL FAILURES
EXPECTED NEED 1 IN 220 FLIGHTS
EXPECTED ERRONEOUS 1 IN 7,440 FLIGHTS
RATIO 34 TO 1
SENSOR CATASTROPHIC POTENTIAL
LOSS OF REDLINE
ENGINE EXCEEDS REDLINE
COMBINED
THREE ENGINE PROBABILITY
MTBF
7.812E-05
0.0015062
1.177E-07
3.53E-07
2,832,780
ERRONEOUS SHUTDOWN (3 ENGINES)
SECOND ENGINE SHUTDOWN
COMBINED
MTBF
UNABLE TO ASSESS ORBITER ABORT RISK
0.0001343
0.0075082
1.009E-06
991,450

CODE
CADS
CADS ELU
CADS FTD
CONT
CONT FD
CONT lEA
ENG RDY
FSPD IC
FTDT
FTDTE
FTIT
FAC
FACE
H20 PR
HEX DP
HEX PR
HEX PR E
HF ACC
HFACC A
HF ACC E
HF ACC N
HF SPO
HGM
HO ACC
HO ACC A
HO ACC C
HO ACC E
HO ACC N
HO BRG T
HO SPD
HO SPD E
INJ ACC
LF ACC
LFACC E
LO AC.C E
LOX T E
LPF TURB
MCC
MCC ACC
MCC PC
MCF ACT
MCF CL
MCF DCU
MCF FD
MCF FTD
MCF F/M
MCF OTD
MCF PC
MOV ACC
O DR DP
ODRP
ODRPE
ODRT
O ISPRG
O ISCDP
OISCP
OISCP E
OTDT =
OTDTE
OTIT
OTITE
OBS
OBSE
OBS FIRE
I:_ PG IC
F'8 PRG
PBP PR
PCICH
PCICL
PC MS
PH/r
PtF
PrO
SATS
TH BNG
TH BNG E
VEH
ID
1
2
3
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29
30
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CUTOFF CODES
DESCRIPTION
COMMAND AND DATA SIMULATOR COMMAND (SIMULATES ORBITER COMPUTER)
CADS - ELECTRONIC LOCKUP
CADS - HPFTP TURBINE DISCHARGE TEMPERATURE REDLINE LOST
ENGINE CONTROLLER INITIATED
CONTROLLER - FUEL DENSITY (OBSOLETE)
CONTROLLER - INPUT ELECTRONICS CHANNEL A
LOSS OF ENGINE READY
HPFTP SPEED IGNITION CONFIRM
HPFTP TURBINE DISCHARGE TEMPERATURE
HPFTP TURBINE DISCHARGE TEMPERATURE - ERRONEOUS
HPFTP TURBINE INLET TEMPERATURE (OBSOLETE)
FACILITY INITIATED CUTOFF (NOT AN ENGINE PROBLEM)
FACILITY INITIATED CUTOFF - ERRONEOUS
FACILITY WATER PRESSURE
HEAT EXCHANGER DELTA PRESSURE (OBSOLETE)
HEAT EXCHANGER PRESSURE (OBSOLETE)
HEAT EXCHANGER PRESSURE - ERRONEOUS
HPF"FP ACCELEROMETERS
HPFTP ACCELEROMETERS - AXIAL (OBSOLETE)
HPFTP ACCELEROMETERS - ERRONEOUS
HPFTP ACCELEROMETERS - NON STANDARD MONITOR (OBSOLETE)
HPFTP SPEED (OBSOLETE)
HOT GAS MANIFOLD DELTA PRESSURE
HPOTP ACCELEROMETERS
HPOTP ACCELEROMETERS - AXIAL (OBSOLETE)
HPOTP ACCELEROMETERS - CROSSFEED FROM HPFTP
HPOTP ACCELEROMETERS - ERRONEOUS
HPOTP ACCELEROMETERS - NON STANDARD MONITOR (OBSOLETE)
HPOTP BEARING COOLANT TEMPERATURE
HPOTP SPEED (OBSOLETE)
HPOTP- ERRONEOUS
MAIN INJECTOR ACCELEROMETERS
LPF'TP ACCELEROMETERS
LPFTP ACCELEROMETERS - ERRONEOUS
LPOTP ACCELEROMETERS - ERRONEOUS
HPOTP LOX DISCHARGE TEMP RISE - ERRONEOUS (OBSOLETE)
LPFTP TURBINE INLET PRESSURE (OBSOLETE)
MCC LINER CAVITY PRESSURE
MAIN COMBUSTION CHAMBER ACCELEROMETERS - ERRONEOUS
MAIN CHAMBER PRESSURE
MAJOR COMPONENT FAIL REPORT - ACTUATOR
MCF - COMMAND LIMIT
MCF - DIGITAL COMPUTER UNIT
MCF - FUEL DENSITY
MCF - HPF'rP TURBINE DISCHARGE TEMPERATURE
MCF - FUEL FLOWMETER
MCF - HPOTP TURBINE DISCHARGE TEMPERATURE
MCF - MAIN CHAMBER PRESSURE
M,'_N OXIDIZER VALVE ACCELEROMETER (OBSOLETE)
HPOTP PRIMARY OXIDIZER SEAL DRAIN DELTA PRESSURE (OBSOLETE)
HPOTP PRIMARY OXIDIZER SEAL DRAIN PRESSURE (OBSOLETE)
HPOTP PRIMARY OXIDIZER SEAL DRAIN PRESSURE - ERRONEOUS
HPOTP PRIMARY OXIDIZER SEAL DRAIN TEMPERATURE (OBSOLETE)
HPOTP INTERMEDIATE SEAL PURGE PRESSURE
HPOTP INTERMEDIATE SEAL CAVITY DELTA PRESSURE (OBSOLETE)
HPOTP INTERMEDIATE SEAL CAVITY PRESSURE (OBSOLETE)
HPOTP INTERMEDIATE SEAL CAVITY PRESSURE ERRONEOUS
HPOTP TURBINE DISCHARGE TEMPERATURE
HPOTP TURBINE DISCHARGE TEMPERATURE - ERRONEOUS
HPOTP TURBINE INLET TEMPERATURE (OBSOLETE)
HPOTP TURBINE INLET TEMPERATURE- ERRONEOUS (OBSOLETE)
MANUAL CUTOFF BY OBSERVER
ERRONEOUS OBSERVER CUTOFF
OBSERVER CUTOFF- FIRE
PREBUI::_ER PURGE IGNITION CONFIRM
PREBUI:_ER PURGE FAILED ON
PREBURNER PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE (OBSOLETE)
CHAMBER PRESSURE IGNITION CONFIRM - HIGH
CHAMBER PRESSURE IGNITION CONFIRM - LOW
CHAMBER PRESSURE MAINSTAGE
POWERHEAD AREA ENVIRONMENT TEMPERATURE
LOW FUEL INLET PRESSURE (FACILITY)
LOW OXIDIZER INLET PRESSURE (FACILITY)
SHUTTLE AVIONICS TEST SET (CLUSTER GROUND TEST ORB! i'lCH COMPUTER SIMULAT(
HPFTP THRUST BEARING SPEED (OBSOLETE)
HPFTP THRUST BEARING SPEED - SENSOR MALFUNCTION (OBSOLETE)
VEHICLE (ORBITER) COMMAND
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ISRB Hypothesis Descriptions
Hypothesis- 1 The analyst made an educated estimate of the anticipated frequency of the
event in question. This was deemed necessary when there was insufficient
data to support a statistical analysis. The estimation was made after
conferring with experts on reliability of the sub-component based on their
respective experience.
Hypothesis-2 Insufficient data to support a statistical analysis was available for the
NASA Standard Initiators (NSIs) and NASA Standard Detonators (NSDs)
however the components were found to be similar in both design and
function as the Conf'med Detonating Fuses (CDFs). However due to
additional elements in the NSI and NSD assemblies they were assumed to
be 2-3 times more prone to fail than the CDF.
Hypothesis-3 The data available for the Pyrotechnic Initiator Controllers (PICs) indicates
that they are extremely reliable components however the fact that no actual
failures have occurred makes the estimation of their failure rate difficult.
As a conservative assumption, their failure rate was assumed to be on the
same order of magnitude as the CDFs.
Hypothesis-4 The ISRB use pyrogenic igniters for which a limited amount of failure data
exists. For this reason the analyst made a conservative assumption based
on the data available and conversations with USBI personnel.
Hypothesis-5 This estimate concerned the possibility of an explosive device detonating
without any external influences; an extremely rare event. A conservative
• estimate was made which considered such an event to be 10 times less
likely than an explosive device (CDF) failing to detonate on command.
Hypothesis-6 The Booster Separation Motors (BSMs) have a limited amount of failure
related data however it was agreed (USBI & MSFC) that the failure modes
were approximately an order of magnitude (10 times) more likely than an
explosive device (CDF) failing to detonate.
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9.0 DEVELOPMENT OF PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS FOR FAULT TREES
The development of probability distributions for the fault trees is done using Bayesian updating
methods. Prior probability distributions for failure rates are taken from the 1987 APU/HPU
study, NPRD-95, [REP, IEEE Std. 500, WASH 1400, Shuttle experience and expert judgment.
System level priors for the entire APU/HYD/WSB system (failure to start and failure to run distri-
butions) are developed using component data mostly from the 1987 study. Bayesian updating
was done at the system level using data found in the in-flight anomaly list (IFAS), PRACA re-
ports, and Post Flight Mission Safety Evaluation Reports.
Data obtained shows that there have been four APU shutdowns on ascent due to the water spray
boiler failing to provide adequate cooling, and a near hydraulic system failure due to a massive hy-
draulic leak during descent.
Due to the fact that the APU/HYD/WSB systems have redundancy, i.e., they are a two-out-of-
three or better system, common cause failures become a concern. The fault trees are evaluated
using the Multiple Greek Letter (MGL) method to determine the common cause and independent
failure rates
Section 9.1 describes how the MGL method is used to determine the independent failure rates and
common cause failure rates from the generic failure rate for each sequence.
Section 9.2 describes the prior distributions used in the study. Fault trees are included in this sec-
tion to show how prior distributions are calculated for APU/HYD/W'SB failure to start,
APU/HYD/WSB failure to run, and APU turbine wheel runaway.
9.1 Models/Equations for Fault Tree Basic Events
9.1.1 List of Basic Events
Table 9.1-1 is a complete list of the basic events found in the fault trees, and their two letter iden-
tification code used throughout the model.
9.1.2 Assumptions
Several assumptions have been made concerning data input probability distributions. The first is
that given a common cause leak, all three APU units leak. The second assumption pertains to the
detection/confirmtion of the leaks. If all three units leak, and a leak is detected in one unit, then
the leaks in all units are assumed to be found. A third assumption concerns the restarts of APU
units. All units will have to go through a restart process sometime during the reent_ process
Some scenarios have APU hydrazine leaks detected, in which case an APU unit is shutdown dur-
ing the entry sequence After an APU unit is shutdown, if another unit fails, then the shutdown
unit is restarted. However, in the sequence, only one restart of the shutdown APU is considered.
There are several reasons for this simplistic modeling. First, the reentry sequence will not begin
until an APU unit is working to perform the flight controls check. Second, leaking APUs are
shutdown only when a leak is detected and confirmed, and the probability of a leak being detected
is only about one in twenty, so these scenario simplifications will not have a significant impact on
the total risk.
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Identification Basic Event
CE
CF
Flight critical equipment damaged given LL or TU
Common cause failure to run
CL Common cause leak
CO No containment given turbine overspeed
CS Common cause failure to start or run
FIB
ID
IF
IS
LA
LD
_Hub breakup given turbine overspeed
I
I
ilndependent/dependent failure to run (ascent)
lindependent failure to run (ascent)
plndependent failure to start or run (descent)
|Leak detected/confirmed given all three APU units leak
Leak detected/confirmed given that one APU unit leaks
Own leakage induced failure (ascent)LF
LK Leak in one APU unit
LL Large exhaust gas or hydrazine leak
LO Leakage from another unit induced failure (ascent)
LS Leakage from other unit induced failure to start or run (descent)
LU Leak undetected given that one APU unit leaks
LZ Leak undetected given that all three APU units leak
Ol
03
APU unit okay given that one other APU unit leaks
unit okay given that all three APU units leak
unit okay
unit okay given that it leaks
OK
OL
OS
SI
SR
TU
UL
Own leakage induced failure to start or run (descent)
Structural integrity of a/t compartment fails given LL or TU
Successful restart of shutdown APU unit
Turbine overspeed or hub failure at normal speed
Unsuccessful single APU/HYD unit reentry, TAEM and landing
Table 9.1-1: List of Basic Events and Descriptions
9.1.3 Derivation of Common Cause Failure Equations
As components fail, it is not always entirely clear which failures are truly independent and which
are common cause. In order to estimate the frequency of common cause failures from the total
estimated frequency, several methods, such as the Multiple Greek Letter (MGL) or beta factor
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methods,areused In thisanalysis,theMGL methodwasused Thelabelingof the APUunits is
asfollows: if a singleAPU unit is leakinghydrazine,thenthat unit is labeledasunit 1, or if all
three APU units are leaking hydrazine,then the unit that is shutdown (if the leaks are
detected/confirmed) is labeled as unit 1.
9.1.3.1 One APU Unit Leaks Hydrazine During Reentrv_ TAEM and Landing (L0
Sequence 4
In this sequence, APU units 1 and 2, or 1 and 3, fail This is basically a 1 out of 3 system, de-
noted Q(I/3) There are two wavs in which independent failures of this type can occur: Q_Q: and
Q_Q3 For the common cause failures, there are also two ways that those may occur: Q__, and
Qw Rewriting those terms in the MGL format using Q_ for independent failures and Q: for com-
mon cause failure of two components yields the following equation for system failures:
Q(I/3) =2Q2 +2Q_
In this form of the MGL method where we are dealing both with common cause failures for two
systems and common cause failures for three systems. The MGL method defines two parameters:
and y. Beta is the ratio of two and three unit common cause failures of each unit to all failures
for each unit. Gamma is the ratio of three unit common cause failures to two and three unit com-
mon cause failures. For each unit, beta is thus:
2Q_23
-- QI+2Q.,+Q3
and gamma is:
Q3
Y = 2Q2-,2:
Omitting the algebra, the single system and common cause for two system failures can be written
as;
Q1 = (1 - _)Q
Q2 = ½(1 - 7)[30
Since Q represents the failures due to start or run failures, it should be rewritten as:
Q =qs+_.t
':_)The LO descent initiating event state is equivalent to the IL0 ascent end state.
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whereqs is the failure to start probability, and _t is the probability of a failure during the run
time. ':33 If we substitute into Q( 1/37 for Q, Q: and Q, then the equation for failures becomes:
O(1/3) = [( 1 - ¥+)13,q, + ( I - y, )13,.Xtl + 21( t - 13+.)q,-+( I - 13r)Xt] 2
This is the total failure rate+ We now need to relate the above equation to the fault tree basic
events. The first term in the above equation is the common cause term, and does not need to be
changed. The second term in the above equation needs to represent the independent failures as
depicted in the fault tree. For example, if we examine the fault tree for the sequence 4 LOV with
the initiating L0 state (one APU unit is leaking), then by analysis at the basic event level, the prob-
ability of the component failures in the sequence can be expressed as:
P(1,2 or 1,3) =P(I It,')P( 2 IU) + P( I IF)P(3 IF) + P( CCF) + P(1 IF)P(3 LO) + . . .
where IF, CCF and LO where defined previously as independent failures, common cause failure,
and own leak induced failure. Since we are only concerned about independent and common cause
failures, we will ignore the fourth and remaining terms as being inapplicable to the determination
of the common cause failure rate and the independent failure rate. If the independent failure rates
are the same for all APU units, then the previous two expressions can be combined as:
P(CCF) = [(1 - y_.)13,.q, +( I - y,.)13_kt]
2P(IF) 2 = 2[( 1 - 13,,.)c1_+ ( 1 - 13,.)_.tl2
If we reduce the independent failure rate probability, we get:
P(IF) = I/I(1 - 13_)q_.+( 1 - 13r)_.tl:
which reduces to:
P(IF) = [(1 - 13_.)q_+( I - [3,.)_.tl
Sequence 6
In this sequence, both APU units 2 and 3 have failed. This is basically a 1 out of 3 system, de-
noted Q(1/3). There is one way in which independent failures of this type can occur: Q:Qs. For
the common cause failures, there is also only one way that this may occur: Q_,3. Rewriting those
terms in the MGL format using Q_ for independent failures and Q2 for common cause failure of
two components yields the following equation for system failures:
Q(l/3) = Q_ +Q2
As before, the single and common cause (for two systems) factors are defined as:
Q I = ( 1 - 13)Q
02 = ½(1 - ¥)13Q ,\
_-'_In this analysis the 13, and [3r are given the same numerical value, and 2, and Z are given the
same numerical value.
,3) For ascent sequences, _is the probability of basic event ID (or IF) in Table 9.3.1. For descent
sequences q_ + _is the probability of a basic event IS in Table 9.3-1.
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SinceQ representsthe failures due to start or run failures, it should be rewritten as:
Q =qs +_,t
where q_ is the failure to start probability, and _.t is the probability of a failure during the run time.
If we substitute into Q(1/3) tbr Q,, Q_, and Q, then the equation for failures becomes:
Q(1/3) = ½[(1 - ¥_)13_q, +( I -7,)[3r_.t] +[(1 - 13_)q, +(1 -- [_r)_l] 2
As before, we can see that the first term represents the common cause failure rate, and the second
tern represents the independent failure rate. If we examine the fault tree for the sequence 6 LOV
with the initiating LO state, then by analysis at the basic event level, the probability of the compo-
nent failures in the sequence can be expressed as:
P(2, 3) = P(2 IF)P(3 IF) +f'(("(7:) +P(2 IF)P(3 LO)+...
where IF, CCF and LO where defined previously as independent failures, common cause failure,
and own leak induced failure. Since we are only concerned about independent and common cause
failures, we will ignore the third and remaining terms as being inapplicable to the determination of
the common cause failure rate and the independent failure rate. If the independent failure rates
are the same for all APU units, then the previous two expressions can be combined as:
P(CCF) = ½[(l -y,.)13._q_ +(l -yr)13_.t]
P(IF): = [(1 - [3s)q, +(1 - [3r)_.t] 2
If we reduce the independent failure rate probability, we get:
P(IF) = _/[(l - 15s)q,. +(l - [_)_.tl:
which reduces to_
P(If) = [(1 - [3_)q, + (i - 13_)_.t]
This is the same expressions as determined in the Sequence 4 LOV.
Sequence 7
In this sequence, since there is no leak detection, no distinction is made between which units fail
and which do not. All three units fail, even though 1 out of 3 is needed for survival, so this is de-
noted Q(I/3). There is one way in which independent failures of this type can occur: Q_Q,Q,
For the common cause failures, there is also only one common cause for all three, QI:3. There are
three combinations of pairs of common cause failures for two systems, i.e., Q_: and Q:3 is one
pair, and three combinations of an independent failure and a common cause failure for two sys-
tems, i.e., Q_ and Q:; and one pair. Rewriting those terms in the MGL format using Q_ for inde-
pendent failures, Q: for common cause failures of two components and Qs for common _use
failures of three components yields the following equation for system failures:
Q(1/3) = Q3 + 3(__)1(._)2+ 3Q_ + (.)_
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Omittingthealgebra,thefailurescanbewrittenas:
Q I = (1 - [3)Q
Q2 = ½(1 - y)[sQ
Q3 = Y_Q
Substituting for Q_, Q, and Q, into Q(1/3) yields:
, lit-vaF _"Q(1/3) = "_]Q + _(1 - [5)[3(1 - yjQ2 + 2___i._,..L2( l _ 13)[5(1 -y)Q2] +(1 - [3)3(2 3
If we examine the above expression, we see that there are four terms, which from left to right
we'll call one, two, three and four. The third term is negligible because
I It-y) R
2 _,., << 1
and is, furthermore, much less than the second term. As before:
Q =qs +_.t
where qs is the failure to start probability, and _.t is the probability of a failure during the run time.
Substitute Q into Q(1/3) with the simplifying assumption yields:
3Q(1/3) = (ys[ssq_. + y,.[5,3.t) + 2{[( 1 - [ss)[3A 1 - y_)q2] + [(1 - [3A[L(1 - YAq,_]+
[(1 - [3,)[3 _( 1 - y,.)q.,._.t] + [( 1 - [3A[3A 1 - y,)_.2: ]} + [( 1 - [5_)q_ + ( 1 - [3,)_.tl 3
As before, we can see that the first term represents the common cause failure rate, and the second
tern represents the independent failure rate. If we examine the fault tree for the sequence 7 LOV
with the initiating L0 state, then by analysis at the basic event level, the probability of the compo-
nent failures in the sequence can be expressed as:
P( 1,2, 3) = P( 1 IF)P(2 1F)P( 3 IF) + P( CCF) + P( 1 LO)P( 2 IF)P(3 IF) +...
where IF, CCF and LO where defined previously as independent failures, common cause failure,
and own leak induced failure. Since we are only concerned about independent and common cause
failures, we will ignore the third and remaining terms as being inapplicable to the determination of
the common cause failure rate and the independent failure rate. If the independent failure rates
are the same for all APU units, then the previous two expressions can be combined as:
P(CCF) = y_[5,q,. + yr[5),.t + _{ [(1 - [3_)[5_(1 - y_)q_21 + [( 1 - [3ALL(1 - yAq_.t]+
[(1 - [3,)[3_( 1 - y_)q,_.tl + [(1 - [5,)[5,.( 1 -yA_?t2l }
P(IF) = [(1 - [5_)q._+ ( 1 - [3,)_,.t]
Sequence 11 ...
In this sequence, two APU units fail, and since the event is undetected, no distinction is made as
to which two have failed. System failures are thus defined as:
,., 2Q(1/3) = 3Q2 + -,Ql
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Asbefore,thefailuresaredefinedas:
Q,= II-_)Q
Q_ =½(*-YI_Q
Since Q represents the failures due to start and run failures, it should be rewritten as:
Q=q_+kt
where qs is the failure to start probability, and kt is the probability of a failure during the run time
If we substitute into Q(1/3) for Qt, Q: and Q, then the equation for failures becomes:
,,p
Q(1/3) = 3[(1 - y_)13,q, + (I - y, )[Lkt] + 3[( 1 - [3_)qs + (! - [3r)kt]"
AS before, we can see that the first term represents the common cause failure rate, and the second
tern represents the independent failure rate. If we examine the fault tree for the sequence 11 LOV
with the initiating L0 state, then by analysis at the basic event level, the probability of the compo-
nent failures in the sequence can be expressed as:
P(2 fail) = P(1 IF)P(2 It,') + P(1 IF)P(3 IF) +P(2 IF)P(3 IF) + P(CCF) +P(2 IF)P(3 LO) +...
where IF, CCF and LO where defined previously as independent failures, common cause failure,
and own leak induced failure. Since we are only concerned about independent and common cause
failures, we will ignore the fifth and remaining terms as being inapplicable to the determination of
the common cause failure rate and the independent failure rate. If the independent failure rates
are the same for all APU units, then the previous two expressions can be combined as:
P(CCF) = }[(1 - ¥_.)13_.q+ (_- ¥,.)[3,.Z.,1
3P(IF) 2 = 3[(1 - [3_.)q, + (l - [3r)kt] 2
If we reduce the independent failure rate probability, we get:
P(IF) = [{1- IL)q_+{1 - 13r)Z.tl
Sequence 12
This sequence occurs when all three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for IL0 sequence 7
Sequence 16
This sequence occurs when APU/HYD systems l and 2 or l and 3 fail. The equations for inde-
pendent system failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 se-
quence 4
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Thissequencealsomodelstheremainingtwo APU units developing a common cause leak, given
the initial leak in one unit. _ As described for OK sequence 21, the formula for common cause
leakage is given by:
P(CCF)= yLI3LX . + - 1- yL)X,:t
Here, _t is the probability ot'the initial state, LO. So, since the conditional probability of devel-
oping the common cause leak is multiplied against the initial state probability, and given that the
first term in the equation is by far the dominant factor, the common cause conditional probability
should be entered as:
P(CCF) = YL[_L
Sequence 18
This sequence occurs when APU/HYD systems 2 and 3 fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 sequence 6. The
equation for a common cause leak is the same as that described for L0 sequence 16.
Sequence 19
This sequence occurs when all APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for independent system
failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 sequence 7. The equa-
tion for a common cause leak is the same as that described for L0 sequence 16.
Sequence 23
This sequence occurs when any two out of the three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for
independent system failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 se-
quence 11. The equation for a common cause leak is the same as that described for L0 sequence
16.
Sequence 24
This sequence occurs when all three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 sequence 7. The
equation for a common cause leak is the same as that described for L0 sequence 16.
9.1.3.2 All Three APU Units Leak Hydrazine During Reentry_ TAEM and Landing {LT
state 
Sequence 4
This sequence occurs when APU/HYD systems 1 and 2 or 1 and 3 fail. The equations for inde-
pendent system failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 se-
quence 4.
_) _'L is the frequency of event LK in Table 9,3-1.
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Sequence 6
This sequence occurs when APU/HYD systems 2 and 3 fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 sequence 6.
Sequence 7
This sequence occurs when all three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 sequence 7.
Sequence 11
This sequence occurs when any two out of the three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for
independent system failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 se-
quence 11.
Sequence 12
This sequence occurs when any two out of the three APU/HYD systems fail The equations for
independent system failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 se-
quence 12
9.1.3.3 All Three APU Units are OK During Reentry_ TAEM and Landing (OK State)
Sequence 4
This sequence occurs when any two out of the three APU/HYD systems fail The equations for
independent system failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 se-
quence 11
Sequence 5
This sequence occurs when all three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 sequence 7.
Sequence 9
This sequence occurs when APU/HYD systems 1 and 2 or 1 and 3 fail. The equations for inde-
pendent system failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 se-
quence 4.
This sequence also involves a common cause treatment of APU leaks. Here, we are modeling any
one of the three APUs develops a leak, which is basically a 1 out of 3 system, denoted as Q( I/3)
There are three ways in which independent failures of this type can occur: Q_, Q_, or Q_. Rewrit-
ing those terms in the MGL format using Q, for the independent failures yields the following
equation for system failures:
Q(1/3) = 3Q_
As before, the failures are identified as:
Q,=11
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Since Q in this case represents leakage failures over the exposure time, Q is replaced bv:
Q=kct
where _'L is the leakage failure rate and t is the exposure time of the system. If we substitute into
Q(1/3) for QI, then the equation for failures becomes:
O(1/3) = 3(1 - _3c)_._t
Since independent failures are the only contributors in this equation, we get:
P(IF) = 3( 1 - [3L)kct
Sequence 11
This sequence occurs when APU/HYD systems 2 and 3 fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 sequence 6. The
equation for independent leaks is the same as that described for OK sequence 9.
Sequence 12
This sequence occurs when all three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 sequence 7 The
equation for independent leaks is the same as that described for OK sequence 9.
Sequence 16
This sequence occurs when any two out of the three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for
independent system failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 se-
quence 11. The equation for independent leaks is the same as that described for OK sequence 9.
Sequence 17
This sequence occurs when all three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 sequence 7. The
equation for independent leaks is the same as that described for OK sequence 9.
Sequence 21
This sequence occurs when APU/HYD systems 1 and 2 or 1 and 3 fail. The equations for inde-
pendent system failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 se-
quence 4.
This sequence also involves a common cause treatment of APU leaks. Here, we are modeling all
three APUs develop leaks The equations for independent and common cause failures are similar
to those described for L0 sequence 7, but with Q defined differently as in OK sequence 9. Omit-
ting the algebra, the new independent and common cause failure rates can be determined by the
following equations:
P(CCF) = Tr-[3LkLt + _(I - [3L)[3L( I - YL)kL_t:
P(IF) = (1 - 13c)kLt
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Sequence 23
This sequence occurs when APU/HYD systems 2 and 3 fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 sequence 6 The
equations for independent and common cause leaks are the same as those described for OK se-
quence 21.
Sequence 24
This sequence occurs when all three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 sequence 7. The
equations for independent and common cause leaks are the same as those described for OK se-
quence 21.
Sequence 28
This sequence occurs when any two out of the three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for
independent system failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 se-
quence 11. The equations for independent and common cause leaks are the same as those de-
scribed for OK sequence 2 I.
Sequence 29
This sequence occurs when all three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for L0 sequence 7. The
equations for independent and common cause leaks are the same as those described for OK se-
quence 21.
9.1.3.4 All Three APU Units are OK During Ascent (OK State)
For the ascent phase, it is assumed that all APU units are already started, otherwise the launch se-
quence would not have been completed. Hence, Q is now defined as:
Q = _.t
Sequence 4
This sequence occurs when all three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are similar to those described for L0 sequence 7, but with
Q defined differently. Omitting the algebra, the new independent and common cause failure rates
can be determined by the following equations:
P(]F) = (1 - [_r)_,t
P(CCF) = y_lg_.t + }( 1 - _3_)13,.(1 - y,.)_._t 2
9.1.3.5 At Least One APU Unit is Leaking Hydrazine During Ascent {LK State) \
Sequence 6
This sequence occurs when all three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for OK sequence 4. The
equation for independent leaks is the same as that described for OK sequence 9.
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Sequence 7
This sequence occurs when one APU unit has an undetected leaks. The equation for independent
leaks is the same as that described for OK sequence 9.
Sequence 12
This sequence occurs when all three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for OK sequence 4. The
equation for independent leaks is the same as that described for OK sequence 9
Sequence 16
This sequence occurs when all three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for OK sequence 4. The
equations for independent and common cause leaks are the same as those described for OK se-
quence 21.
Sequence 17
This sequence occurs when all three APU units have undetected leaks. The equations for inde-
pendent and common cause leaks are the same as those described for OK sequence 21.
Sequence 20
This sequence occurs when all three APU/HYD systems fail. The equations for independent sys-
tem failures and common cause failures are the same as those described for OK sequence 4 The
equations for independent and common cause leaks are the same as those described for OK se-
quence 21.
9.1.3.6 MGL Parameters
The following point estimates are generic over all components and all failure modes. They were
developed as part of a recent effort funded by EPRI to completely automate the process of ana-
lyzing common cause failures in PRAs. The software is available through Boyer Chu at EPRI.
This recent effort was based on previous data development and MGL method development found
in EPRI INP 3967 (1985), NUREG/CR-4780 (1988), and NUREG/CR-5801 (1993).
For information on methods and procedures for common cause failure you can refer to
NUREG/CR-4780 (1988) and NUREG/CR-5801 (1993).
APU component failure rates are generally within the variability range of the generic database
from which the Beta and Gamma factors are derived. We believe, therefore, that these are an in-
dication of future failure rates of the APU, and the generic factors apply to the APUs.
We also used the generic data for common cause hydrazine leakage. We have found six leaks
(see Section 9.2.2.6). Two of the leaks happened in the same mission (STS-9) for a common
cause (carbonization and stress cracking of the injector). The Beta factor could be estimated as
1/3 (3 of 6). However, we know that the manufacturing process has been altered to reduce the
likelihood of this cause. There has also been an effort to reduce the exposure of the nozzles to
hydrazine between missions We have used, therefore, a generic Beta factor of 0.1 instead of the
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data driven Beta factor of 1/3. \Ve see no justification to apply a Beta factor less than indicated
by the generic level.
9.1.4 Equations Graphed in Fault Tree for Illustration
As an example of how the independent failure rate and common cause failure rate equations de-
veloped in the previous section are applied, see Figure 9. l-1. In tile figure is a simple fault tree
that shows the sequence 4 LOV for the ascent phase in which no hydrazine leaks have occurred.
l APU/HYD ]Unit 1 Failure
Independent
Failure
LOV
All Three APU/HYD
Units Have Failures
(I
APU/HYD APU/HYD
Unit 2 Failure Unit 3 Failure
I
APU/HYD Unit 2
Independent
Failure
J
Common
Cause Failure I APU/HYD Unit 3
Independent
Failure
P(1 IF) P(CCF) P(2 IF) P(CCF) P(3 IF) P(CCF)
CommonCause Failure
Figure 9.1-1: Fault Tree for LOV Sequence 4 for an OK State During Ascent
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For the LOV to occur, all three APU/HYD systems must fail. System failures can occur inde-
pendently, or as common cause failures. These failure rates were determined from the total failure
rate using the Multiple Greek Letter method previously described, and are shown under the basic
events to which they pertain
From before, we defined P(CCF) and P(IF) as:
P(IF) = (1 - [L)kt
P(CC = + }(1 - 1 -¥,.)x2r:
9.2 Prior Distribution for Model
The priors used in the assessment of P(IF) came from a previous study (McDonnell Douglas As-
tronautics Company Engineering Services, Space Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment Proof-of-
Concept Study Volume III: Auxiliary Power Unit and Hydraulic Power Unit Analysis Report, pa-
per WP-VA88004-03, 1987) As described previously, the priors were updated at the system
level with observed Shuttle in flight failures.
9.2.1 Inputs Needed to Develop Priors
The study performed in 1987 was done at a component level; i.e., the failure rates of the compo-
nents in the system were calculated, and no quantification was done on the system level. This
study has defined basic events on the system level in order to have such information for future
decision-making Two prior distributions, the failure to start on demand and the run failure rate,
were estimated using the component level data.
The fault tree in Figure 92-1 depicts the component failures that most contribute to a system fail-
ure to run. These components failure rates were agglomerated to obtain a prior distribution for
APU system failure to run (events, [D, IF and IS).
Similarly, Figure 92-2 depicts a fault tree in which any of the component failures may cause a
failure to start condition. These component failure rates were agglomerated for the start
contribution of event IS.
The 1987 study performed a detailed fault tree for turbine overspeed Quantification of that tree
showed that four events dominated the failure probability. These are shown in a simplified fault
tree in Figure 9.2-3.
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9.2.2 Output Distributions for Priors
9.2.2.1 APU Failure to Run
The first prior calculated is that for an APU to fail to run. Table 92-1 lists the component failures
frequency distributions that were in the model for APU subsystem run failures,
Failure
Primary Valve Falls Closed When Pulsing
Isol. Valve Plugs (Contamination _When Open
Magnetic Pickup Unit Fails l,ox_
Fuel Pump Fails To Run
Lube Oil Pump Falls To Run
Lube Oil System Loss Or" Flo_
Gas Generator Falls To Run
[ Mean-Dist
4.481E-03
(1)
1 086E-06
2.240E..O3
7685E-05
7.685E-O5
2.664E-O3
1.436E-O4
I 5th percentile
[
I 3494E-04
1 4681E-08
1.747E4)4
6.04 IE-04
2.791E-06
2.791E-O6
9 334E-O5
9.020E-07
Median ] 95th percentile[ Reti (I_
2.404E--03
4.343E-07
1202E-O3
2.SgTE-05
2.g87E-05
9.698E4)4
2.467E-O5
1.225E-02
3.875E-06
6.127E-03
2797E-04
2797E4).4
9.681E-03
4 429E4M
1 837E-032,722E-O5
4.332E-04
3.385E-O5 i
2.350E-04Turbine Fails To Run i I
Gearbox Fails To Run 2.628E-O5 9.323E-O7 9.672E-O6 9651E-05 1
Fuel Inline Filter Plugs 7.959E-O6 2.799E-07 2.907E-06 2894E-05 1
Fuel Pump Filter Plugs 2.040E-0,-I 2.722E-O6 5.002E-O5 6 507E-04 1
Failure Of Electric F_'r 1'o Secondary Valves 4.926E-O5 9231E-O7 1.357E-O5 1.866E4)4 1
HYD Accumulator Falls To Run 2.664E-O5 I.OE-O6 1.0E-O5 1.OE-04 2
HYD Reservoir Fails To Run 2.664E-O5 1.0E-O6 1.0E-O5 1.0E-O4 2
HYD Lme Filter Plugs 7.840E-06 60E-O6 7.746E-O6 1.0E-05 3
HYD Relief Valve Opens Spuriously 1.212E-05 YOE-O6 9.487E-06 3OE-O5 5
HYD Main Pump Fails Fo Run 4.040E-O5 I.OE-O5 3.162E-O5 1 0E-0.4 25
HYD Circulation Pump Fails To Run 1.127E-O4 7.0E-O6 5.292E-05 4.0E-O4 2,3
HYD Fluid Leak (Catastrophic) 5.0E-O6 5.0E-O5 5.0E-O4 1,3,4
2.236E-05 5,0E-06 2,51.0E-O4
3.059E-O3 6.956E-O3 2.174E-.O2
i
9.150E-O3 [
Shuttle history of O failures is 882 demands in a maximum
entropy log normal- 882 = (6 APU Starts/Missions + 4 I_U starts
+ 4 HPU Hot Fire Tests ) x 63
Water Spray Boiler Fails To Cool
Total Fail To Run/Hr
I. t 987 APU Stud,,' 40REDA
2. NPRD-95 5 WASH-1400
3. IEEE-STD-500
Table 9.2-1: Component Failures Leading to APU System Run Failure (Failures/hour)
In order to calculate the distribution of the sum of these failures, an @Risk Monte Carlo simula-
tion (20,000 trials) in a Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet was used. A graphical representation of this dis-
tribution can be seen in Figure 9.2-4.
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9.2.2.2 APU Failure to Start
In Table 9.2-2, various component failures are listed that will lead to a failed-start condition.
Once again, to calculate the failed-start distribution based on the sum of the various component
failures, an @Risk Monte Carlo simulation (20,000 trials) in a Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet was used.
Forecast: TOTAL FAIL TO RUN
Frequency ChartCell D23
047
.035 ................................................ 690.7
00oiliit tlqlilHt11,,,i,ii,ii i;iiiiiiiiiiii iiiii iiiiil" O
0.000E*0 8.750E-3 1.750E-2 2.625E-2 3.500E-2
19,718 Trials Shown
[ 921
Figure 9.2-4: f-WRisk Simulation Results for Failure to Run Frequency
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Failure
Bypass Valve Fails To Open (m I)emaxld
Mean-Dtst
t
! 4.689E-II4
5th percentile Median _ 95th percentile
t
p 1276E-03
r
1690E4)5 1.730E-O4
Common Cause Heater Tram 13 Failure 6 5E-O5 4.6Eq)06 36E-O5 l 1.5E-O4 I I
Common Cause Lube Oil Heater Dam Fatlure 2. IE-O5 5 3E-O7 7 8E-O6 5 7E-O5 I
Fuel Pump Falls To Start I 278E-05 9 139E-O8 2.138E-06 4 702E-05 1
I 278E-05Lube Oil Pump Falls To Start 9 139E-O8
Turbine Fails To Start
Gearbox Fails To Start
2 138E-06 4 702E-05
Electnc Pwr To Pnmarv Valve Falls
i
!Electric Power To Secondarx Valve Fails 6.207E-04 1.329E-05 2045E-04 1.879E-03 1
7.409E-O4 3.447E-05 3260E-O4 2.032E413 1
1.278E-O5 9.139E-O8 2.138E4)6 4.702E-O5 1
1.278E4)5 9.139E-O8 2.138E-06 4 702E-05 1
6 2E-04 1.3E-05 2.0E-04 I 9E-O3 1
4 0E-04
4 475E-03
4 475E-03
1 1205E-O2
multiplication
MPU Fails Lo_
HYD Main Pump Fails To Start
HYD Accumulator Has No Pressure At Start
HYD Reservoir Low/No Fhud At Start
Total Failures To Start
"' Converted hourly failure rate to a start thilure by
4683E-05
168E-O4
1,68E4)4
3.322E-03
1, 1987 APU Study
2. NPRD-95
3. IEEE-STD-500
4. OREDA
2.426E-O-I
1.680E-O3
1.680E4)3
7949E-O3 !
by exposure time ( 168 hours )
1.257E-O5 6
1.68E-02 2 '''
1 68E-O2
3 342E-O2
6. Shuttle history of 0 failures is 882 demands m
Table 9.2-2:
Reference
I
2111
5. WASH-1400 a maxmmm entropy log normal: 882 = (6 APU Starts/
Missions + 4 HPU Starts + HPU Hot Fire Tests) x 63
Component Failures Leading to APU System Start Failure
(Failures/Demand to Start)
The @Risk Monte Carlo simulation (20,000 trials) for the failure to start probability distribution
can be seen in Figure 9.2-5.
Cell D47
.064
.048
032
r,_ o16
.000
0.000E÷0
Forecast: TOTAL FAILURES TO START
Frequency Chart 19,671 Trials Shown
1258
!! ,,,, !
• II I,,, ,,..,..... ........ 0
I. 375E-2 2.750E-2 4.125E-2 5.500E-2
Figure 9.2-5: @Risk Simulation Results for Failure to Start Frequency
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9.2.2.3 Turbine Overspeed and Hub Failure at Normal Speed
Figure 9.2-3 depicted the fault tree for a turbine overspeed condition which is an initiating event
(TU). Prior distributions were obtained from the 1987 APU study. The following Table 92-3
provides the priors and the in-flight shuttle data used for the likelihood function. The posterior
failure rates of these various components are listed in Table 9.2-5. To calculate the turbine over-
speed frequency distribution based on fault tree logic, @Risk Monte Carlo simulation (20,000 tri-
als) in a Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet was used.
Event
PASVC
TASVE
TAMIL
PAPVE
Prior (Log Normal)
5 Percentile
8x10 -5/D
Ix i 0 -4/hr
5x10 -5/hr
1x 10 -4/hr
Prior (Log Normal)
'95 Percentile
7x10 -3/D
I x 10 -2/hr
5x10 -3/hr
lxl0 -2/hr
Shuttle
Specific Data
1/378 Demands
0/0 ,z:>
1/796 hrs _3,
1/292 hrs ,4,
qll
¢_ 2 Demand/APU x 63 millions x 3 APUs/Missons = 378 Demands
<:) Failure of primary valve in mission SB-31 generated a demand on the secondary valve for a few minutes before
the launch was scrubbed. The secondary valve did not fail.
_3) 1.33 hours/APU x 3 APUs/Missions x 3 FIPUs/APUs x 63 Missions = 796 hours
c_) 1.33 hours/APU x 3 APUs/Missions x 63 Missions = 292
Table 9.2-3: Priors and In-Flight Shuttle Data Used for the Likelihood Function
Shuttle in-flight failures used in the above table are described below in Table 9.2-4:
Car
No.
AC8511-01
Date
08/06/84
Flight APU Basic
No. No. Event
41B 3 PASVC
AC0055-01 07/24/81 1
04/24/91 STS-31IFA
STS-31-01
2 TAMIL
1 PAPVE
Description
GGVM Shut offvalve leaking at a
rate of 248 scim due to a broken
poppet valve seat
!MPU #2 was inopr.; MPU resistance
measured open
Primary pulse control valve chipped
(valve sent failure) allowing
hydrazine to continue flowing.
Secondary valve took over. Launch"
scrubbed.
Table 9.2-4: APU Turbine Component Failure Descriptions
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The@RiskMonteCarlo simulation(20,000trials) for the failureto start probabilitydistribution
canbeseenin Figure9 2-6
Failure
PrimaryValveFailsOpenDuringPulsing
MagneticPickupUnitFallsLo_
SecondaryValveFailsOpenDuringPulsing
i Mean-Dist
! 1477E-03
2.240E-03
9.602E-04
5thpercentile
6852E-05
1.747E-04
5.032E-05
Median 195th percentile !
6,500E-04 4.0_4E-0__
1.202E-03 6.127E-03
4.484E-04 2.685E-03
Secondary Valve Fails To Close On Demand 2.631E-03 2.305E-04 1504E-03
Total Probabilit3 For Turbine 2.518E-04 6.733E-06 7.530E-05
Overspeed/Flight"'
_1_ All APUs included
Table 9.2-5: Posterior Failure Rate Data for Component Failures
Leading to Turbine Overspeed
7 500E-03
I
9 403E-04
Forecast: TOTAL TURBINE OVERSPEED FREQUENCY PER FL
Cell D5 Frequency Chart 19.591 Trials Shown
.033 i i , r 643
! llliil,,,,, !!!!!N
. . . . ,= hi •
0.000E÷0 5.625E-5 1.125E-4 1.688E-4 2.250E-4
Figure 9.2-6: @Risk Simulation Results for Turbine Overspeed Frequency
Turbine hub failure at normal speed is not a significant contributor to the probability of this e_ent.
APU hub cracking is mapped and it has been shown by analysis (at JSC) that the likelihood of
blade cracking propagating to a hub crack is very small. Furthermore, experiments on hub
breakup show that even a notched or drilled hub requires a speed significantly above nominal to
induce hub failure. NPRD-95 has a value of turbine failure of about 10 -Sdar. for all modes com-
bined, not just hub failure. Therefore, hub failure at normal speed is at least an order of magni-
tude less in probability then turbine overspeed
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9.2.2.4 Other Prior Distributions
The remaining prior distributions were taken directly from the 1987 study, were defined by MGL
analysis, or were a result of our assessment. U1 of the prior distributions are in Table 92-8_ The
two letter descriptions were discussed previously in Table 9 I-1.
Some events, such as an APU OK state, are not in this table since they are not incorporated into
the quantification of the scenarios. For some inputs only a mean value was estimated.
9.2.2.5 Large Exhaust Gas or Hydrazine Leak (LL)
This prior distribution was generated by breaking the event down into its three major contribu-
tors: tank/pipe rupture: hot gas leak; and isolation valve leak/rupture. For both the tank/pipe rup-
ture and hot gas leak modes, a failure rate range based on variability was defined from
Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data 1995 (NPRD-95). The median value from this range was
multiplied by the 1.5 hour total APU run time for ascent and descent, and times 3 for the number
of APUs, to get a point estimate failure probability for the system per flight.
A failure rate range was also defined for the isolation valve leak from NPRD-95. In this case, the
range was treated as defining the 5th and 95th percentiles of a iognormal distribution which was
used as the prior in a Bayesian update. The evidence data consisted of two incidents in which
cracks were found in APU and HPU isolation valves which did not propagate to a through crack
of the valve casing that separates the flow path from the solenoid cavity. The concern here is that
when hydrazine comes in contract with the solenoid it could decompose and rupture the isolation
valve causing an unisolatable leak. These were not "hard" failures, but are valid evidence of fail-
ure potential. They were treated, therefore, by a near miss methodology as follows.
The solution was to treat the data according to the probability that these incidents might propa-
gate into "hard" failures on other flights, where the circumstances might be different. This is a
matter of judgment on the part of the analyst. In this case, since these incidents were determined
to have a low probability of propagating to "hard" failures, the evidence was treated as having a
5% probability of representing l failure in 72000 hours (a lower bounding estimate of the total ex-
posure time for APU and HPU isolation valves), and a 95% chance of representing zero failures in
72000 hours. The overall posterior distribution was then generated by taking a weighted average
(according to the previously determined weights) of the two possible posterior distributions.
The following Table 9.2-6 shows the prior distributions.
Tank/Pipe Replace (prior 0nly)
5 Percentile
10 -9/hr.
95 Percentile
10 -7/hr.
Exposure Time
63x3x 1.5hrs.
Hot Gas Leak (prior only) same same same
Isolation Valve (prior) 1 x 10 -7/hr. 10 -7/hr. 72000 hrs.
Isolation Valve (updated) 1.2 x 10 -9/hr. 8 x 10 -8/hr.
Table 9.2-6: Distributions for Large Hydrazine or Exhaust Gas Leak
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The data used in the isolation valve analysis is anecdotal. We are aware of a crack discovered in
an APU isolation valve before STS-I. We are also aware of a recent crack found in an HPU, that
when tested post-flight, leaked hydrazine into the solenoid cavity.
9.2.2.6 Leak in One APU Unit (LK)
A Bayesian analysis was not performed for hydrazine leaks. Shuttle in-flight experience was used
to generate a point estimate of the rate at which hydrazine leaks develop. This rate was based on
the data in Table 92-7, showing 6 leaks in 31752 hours of exposure time (63 flights x 3 APUs x
assumed average flight duration of 7 days x 24 hours/day). To generate a probability distribution,
the point estimate was assumed to be the mean value of a maximum entropy (_ = 1.0) lognormal
distribution.
This assessment was based on a number of assumptions. We assume that the APUs are leak
checked and only launched if found acceptable. Hydrazine leaks may occur at any time during the
mission. Exposure to hydrazine may cause leaks even without the system operating. However,
the leaks may only be revealed when the system is operating.
CAR IFAS i Flight Date APU # Description
** ICR 04/12/81 1 Hyd. leak from fuel pump cover
** I CR 04/12/81 2 Hyd. leak at fuel pump inlet fitting
09F012-01 STS-9 11/28/83 1 Hyd. leak from cracked fuel injector
tube *
09F013-01 STS-9 11/28/83 2 Hyd. leak from cracked fuel injector
tube *
X STS-51F 07/29/.85 1 Hyd. leak into gearbox ***
X i STS-45 03/24/92 1 Hyd. leak into gearbox ****
APU failed due to the hydrazine leak
** Data from APU subsystem manager database
:*** This leak was detected by increased pressure in the gearbox and the start of APU2 was
delayed until Vrel = !Ok
**** On this same mission APU2 leaked oil / GN2 from the gearbox to the aft compartment
X STS-45 03/24/92 2 Lube oil / GN2 leak from gearbox
through turbine seal
Table 9.2-7: Hydrazine Leakage History on STS
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TheAPUscontainmanypotentialleakagesites. Thedatasimplyindicatesthat somehavealready
occurred.Othershaveyet to becomeactive Becauseof this,wedo not necessarilyview
correctiveactionsto individualleakagesitesasreducingthepredictedfrequencyof leaks. Rather.
we treatpastleaksasindicativeof futurerates.
9.2.2.7 Leak Detected Confirmed (LD and LA)
The first four leaks above were not detected during the mission. The last two leaks were detected
by increased pressure in the gearbox. We assess the probability of leak detection, and APU de-
layed start, as ! in 6 based on this data. Since no action has ever been taken on leaks during as-
cent, this indicated zero probability of leak detection on ascent. The use of zero detected and
confirmed leaks during ascent avoids the paradox associated with a groundrule of this study The
groundrule is that aborts are assumed to be successful. Therefore, a failure that leads to an APU
induced abort actually reduces the calculated risk. Flight rules call for an APU shutdown and an
MDF abort if a single hydrazine leak is detected and confirmed. Two such leaks lead to a PLS
abort. To avoid having to treat leaks as successes, we assume no detection on ascent.
9.2.2.8 Own Leakage/Other Leakage Induced Failures (LF and LO)
These prior distributions were defined through a data based assessment utilizing the 1987 study,
PRACA records, hazards analyses and an understanding of the phenomenology of the failure
_nodes. Specifically, the mean value for own leakage induced failure during descent was defined
from the data shown in Table 92-7, indicating 2 APU failures in 6 leaks. The mean values for the
other three conditional probabilities were then derived by maintaining the ratios between the val-
ues from the 1987 study and scaling them to the 0.3 defined for LF (des). This produced values
of 02 for LO (des), 0. ! for LF (asc) and 0.008 for LO (asc).
An assessment of the applicable distributions was then made for the four probabilities. In the case
of LF (des), an upper 40 bound of 0.5 was defined for the distribution, assuming a normal distri-
bution. For LF (asc), an upper 40 bound of 0.2 was defined, again assuming a normal distribu-
tion. And for LO (asc), given the small value of the mean (0.008), a lognormal distribution was
judged to be more applicable, as greater uncertainty is expected for small defined values. For this
distribution, an Error Factor of 5 was assumed. For the normal distributions, values below zero
should be truncated when using the defined distributions.
In the case of LO (des), data is available for a Bayesian update of the assessed value, so the distri-
bution needs to be defined much broader than for the other cases (where the posterior was being
defined directly), in order to overlap the likelihood function of the evidence. The prior distribu-
tion was defined using 0.2 as the mean value for a maximum entropy (o = 1.0) lognormal distribu-
tion. This was updated with evidence of 0 APU failures in 12 APUs exposed to other units
leaking. Note the following for each leak: There are 2 opportunities for another APU to fail ow-
ing to the leak and 1 opportunity for itself to fail. For 6 leaks, there are 6 x 2 = 12 opportunities
for failure of another APU owing to the leak. None has occurred. The mean value of LO (des)
drops to 0.07 given this evidence. The result of the Bayesian analysis is shown graphically in Fig-
ure 9.2-7.
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9.2.2.8.1 Sensitivity Treatment ofAPU 3 Failures
The previous section described the baseline treatment of these conditional probabilities. In the
case of APU failure due to another units leakage (LO), it could be argued that APU 3 needs to be
treated differently APU 3 is physically located about 6' (on the starboard side) from the other
two units, which are only a few inches apart Thus, we believe that there is a lesser chance of
APU 3 failing due to leakage in unit 1 than an APU 2 failure.
Our fault tree treatment is conservative in that each APU is considered "identical" It does not
capture "full credit" for cases in which the actual APU 3 is leaking, which would lead to reduced
LO conditional probabilities for both of the other units.
One way of capturing this logic would be to drop the LO conditional probability to a lower value
for all of the APU 3 terms In order to illustrate the affect this would have on the results, two of
the most significant leakage fault trees have been quantified, at the mean value, for these two
cases. For the baseline case:
OK Initial State on Entry, Seq. 16 4.159E-04
• OK Initial State on Entry,, Seq. 17 1.700E-04
For the sensitivity case, using as an example O.01 as the unit 3 LO (des) probability:
• OK Initial State on Entry, Seq. 16 2.479E-04
• OK Initial State on Entry, Seq. 17 6.214E-05
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Figure 9.2-7: Bayesian Analysis Result for LO (Des)
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9.2.2.9 Unsuccessful Single APU/HYD Unit Reentry_ TAEM and Landing {UL)
This prior distribution was generated according to judgment weighted by several factors. First,
such landings are regularly simulated successfully in training. To the extent that the simulator is
successful in characterizing the vehicle response given a single APU/HYD unit, this gives cre-
dence to a very high probability of success However, this is tempered by the fact that a single
APU/HYD unit landing is not certified by the program. Unfavorable weather conditions coupled
with slower control rates could potentially indicate a much higher probability of a failed landing.
The assessment team has translated this into a range of 80% to 100% for a successful landing It
was also determined that the lack of a strong conviction for any values within this range war-
ranted a uniform distribution for this range.
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ID
CE
CF
CL
CO
CS
FIB
ID
IF
IS
LA
LD
LF
OS
LK
LL
LO
LS
LU
LZ
SI
SR
TU
UL
136-factor
N/A
Calculated
Calculated
N/A
Calculated
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
see posterior
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
PRIOR (/hr or/demand)
m__
; Mean
+
05 (EL)
0.88 (TU)
'using applicable
using applicable
using applicable
0.9
9.150E-03/hr
9.150E-03/hr
1.205E-02/start
9.150E-03/hr
0.0 (asc)
O. 1667 (des)
0.0 (asc)
0.1667 (des)
1.0E-01 (asc)
1.890E-04/hr
2.8E-05
8OE-03 (asc)
2.0E-1 (des)
1.0 (asc)
0.8333 (des)
1.0 (asc)
0.8333 (des)
1.0 (LL)
0.88 (TU)
0.98795/start
2.5 ! 8E-04
0.1
Median 5th 95th
MGL method ,'formulas
MGL method
MGL method
6.956E-03/hr
6.956E-03/1-u"
7.949E-03/start
6.956E-03/hr
1.0E-01 (asc)
1.152E-04/hr
5.0E-03 (asc)
1.2E -01
0.99205/start
7.530E-05
0.1
formulas
formulas
3.059E-03/hr
3.059E-03/hr
3.322E-03/start
3.059E-O3/hr
6.0E-02 (asc)
2.224E-05/hr
9.9E-04 (asc)
2.3E-02
0.99668/start
6.733E-06
0.01
2.174E-02/hr
2.174E-02/hr
3.342E-02/start
2.174E-02/hr
1.4E-01 (asc)
5.971E-04/hr
2.5E-02 (asc)
6.36-01
.96658/start
9.403E-04
0.19
Table 9.2-8: Prior Probability Distributions
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9.3 Posterior Distributions for APU/HYD/WSB Failure to Run and Start (Ascent and
Descent
Posterior distributions were determined by updating the prior distributions with available data us-
ing Bayes' Theorem Data points not only include failures of the APU and HYD systems, but also
the Water Spray Boiler (WSB) WSB failures, which lead to an APU shutdown and subsequent
hydraulic loss, were not examined in the previous 1987 study, so data was extracted for these fail-
ures from all Shuttle flights Other data points pertaining to these failures were taken from post-
Challenger flights (1988) to STS-65 (flight 63, 7/8/94).
9.3.1 Water Spray Boiler Failures Used in the Analysis
9.3.1.1 03-23-1982 STS-3
WSB 3 freeze-up during ascent. APU temperature message at lift-off plus 4 minutes 23 seconds
reported lube oil temperature climbing. Controller B was then selected, but the temperature con-
tinued to rise. APU 3 shutdown at liftoff plus 8 minutes, and the right main engine went into hy-
draulic lock-up. After ascent, at lift-off plus one hour, controller A was then selected: both
controllers appeared to be working properly. The maximum APU 3 lube oil temperature was
330°F, and the maximum bearing temperature was between 355 and 360°F. FCS checkout tested
both controllers, and both were 100% nominal. This situation was also seen on STS-1 and 2.
9.3.1.2 08-02-1991 STS-43
WSB 2 failed to provide cooling to the auxiliary power unit 2 lube oil throughout the mission.
APU 2 (serial number 208) has been involved in lube oil over temperatures during seven of its
eight flights. The WSB did not cool the lube oil on controller A following ascent. The crew
switched to controller B when the lube oil return temperature reached approximately 297°F. The
APU was operated an additional 1.5 minutes on the B controller, and still no cooling was ob-
served. The APU was shutdown when the lube oil return temperature reached 323°F. The WSB
is designed to control the lube oil temperature to 250-a:2°F.
An extended flight control system check-out using APU 2 was performed and the WSB was not
cooling on either controller. The APU ran for 11 minutes during check-out, then was shutdown
and declared lost. During descent, APU 2 was activated at terminal area energy management due
to the lack of cooling. The lube oil reached 259°F before shutdown after wheel stop with no evi-
dence of cooling. The spray boiler may not have had the chance to function, however, as this
temperature is close to the 250°F control limit.
9.3.1.3 09-12-1992 STS-47
During ascent, WSB 3 (serial number 15) exhibited no cooling until just prior to the early shut-
down of APU 3. The lube oil temperature reached approximately 292°F when the controller was
switched from A to B. The lube oil temperature continued to rise to 31 I°F when the decision was
made to shut down APU 3 early. Prior to APU 3 deactivation, the WSB GN2 regulator outlet
pressure indicated that spraying had begun. WSB 3 continued to spray until the spray logic was
turned off(1 minute 43 seconds). Steady-state cooling was never achieved on either controller
since the lube oil temperature was not allowed to drop to 250°F prior to boiler spray logic
shutdown.
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APU 3 was selected to perform FCS checkout The checkout time frame was extended to verify
WSB 3 cooling performance. The extended run time demonstrated satisfactory, cooling on both
controllers (3 minutes 42 seconds for B, then 1 minute 47 seconds for A). WSB lube oil and hy-
draulic cooling performance during entry was nominal.
Spray bar freeze up remains the most likely cause of the WSB failure, although it could have re-
sulted from spray valve or controller failures.
9.3.1.4 01-13-1993 STS-54
During ascent, WSB 3 (serial number 15) exhibited no cooling until just after the early shutdown
of APU 3. The lube oil return temperature reached approximately 295°F when the WSB was
switched from controller A to B The lube oil return temperature reached 315°F when the deci-
sion was made to shut down APU 3 early. After deactivation, the WSB 3 GN2 regulator pressure
indicated that spraying had started. WSB 3 continued to spray until the spray logic was turned off
(approximately 35 seconds). Steady-state cooling was never achieved on controller A or B.
APU 3 was selected to perform the FCS check-out The FCS checkout time frame was extended
to verify WSB cooling performance The extended APU 3 run-time demonstrated satisfactory
cooling on both controllers, with a minor overcool observed on controller A APU performance
using controller B during entry was nominal
Spray bar freeze-up remains the most probabl e cause of this cooling problem. However, data
analysis also indicated that the local pressure at the vent nozzle of system 3 during ascent was
somewhat higher than the other two systems. This high pressure is due to the location of the sys-
tem 3 vent nozzle outlet (it is farther forward than the system l and 2 vent nozzle outlets). Sys-
tem 3's pressure remains higher than the other systems for the first 80 seconds of ascent, which is
believed to be a contributing factor toward the repeated freeze-up anomalies observed in system
3.
Spray bar freeze-up conditions occur when the water triple point condition is met inside the heat
exchanger. In the worst case freeze-ups, it is postulated the water triple point was reached prior
to MECO. By increasing the water preload, the duration of heat exchanger tube bundle/water
preload contact can be increased, which will reduce the likelihood/severity of spray bar freeze-up
by maintaining pressure above the water triple point past MECO. The ongoing spray bar freeze-
up test analysis indicates that the severity of the bar freeze-up at water triple point conditions may
inversely correlate to the amount of water in the boiler. Therefore, KSC has been requested to
preload WSB 3 to 5 +/-0.1 ibs. of water (normal is 3.75 +/-0.24 lbs.).
9.3.2 Possible Water Spray Boiler Failure
It is unknown whether or not this reported problem is an actual failure or not. For this analysis, it
has not been considered as an actual data point.
9.3.2.1 04-29-1985 STS-SIB
Shortly aiter MECO, the backup flight system indicated an APU 3 lube oil over temperature con-
dition. The crew switched from controller A to B at a lube oil temperature of 320°F. The tem-
perature continued to rise for an additional 20 seconds and reached a peak of 337°F, The crew
was instructed to shutdown APU 3 to avoid reaching the lube oil temperature limit of 355°F The
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APU 3 lube oil temperature had decreased to approximately 320°F at shutdown, indicating that
water spray boiler controller 3B was properly controlling iube oil cooling Post flight testing has
been unsuccessful in duplicating this problem The A controller was replaced
9.3.3 Possible Hydraulic System Failure
9.3.3.1 02-28-1990 STS-36
Appendix C contains descriptions from PRACA records and hazards analyses of a "near-miss"
failure involving a flex hose rupture in the hydraulic system.
9.3.4 Updated Posterior Distribution
The four WSB failures in Section 9.3.1 were counted as APU shutdowns. All three of these fail-
ures occurred during the ascent phase. One of these failures was permanent and caused a late re-
start of the APU during the entry phase, but was not counted as a failure during the reentry phase
because it successfully completed its mission. For reentry, the hydraulic system rupture is
counted as a possible APU/HYD unit failure in the update. The methodology for this type of up-
date is described in section 9.2.2.5, where in this case the weighting uses 50% for 1 failure and
50% for zero failures. In the data column, if no data is available (i.e., no "trials"), an N/A for not
applicable is placed in the box.
The common cause failure calculations for the MGL formulas used the ID and IS values, assum-
ing 20 minutes for ascent and l hour for descent. The MGL calculations also used generic 13and
y values of 0.1 and 0.27, respectively.
Table 9.3-1 lists the data and corresponding posterior probability distributions for the basic
events. The means from these data distributions are used as basic event probability distribution
inputs for use in SAIC's CAFTA model.
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ID
CE
CF
CL
CO
CS
lib
ID
IF
IS
LA
LD
LF
OS
LK
LL
LO
LS
LU
LZ
SI
SR
TU
UL
Data
N/A
POSTERIOR /hr or/demand)
P Median 5th 95th' Mean
0.5 (LL)
0.88 (TU)
Calculated using applicable MGL method
Calculated Jusing applicable MGL method
N/A 1
Calculated using applicable MGL method
N/A 0.9
4/63 hrs 1.931E-02/hr2078E-02/hr
2.078E-02/hr
5.677E-03/start
formulas
formulas
formulas
1.030E-02/hr 3.622E-02/hr
1.030E-02/hr4/63 hrs 1.931E-02/hr 3.622E-02/hr
0/189 starts 4.448E-03/start 1.433E-03/start 1. 194E-02/start
0 to 1/252 hrs i 6.479E-03/hr 5.614E-03/hr 2.369E-03/hr 1219E-02/hr
b
N/A I 0.0 (asc)
0.1667 (des)
N/A 0.0 (asc)
0.1667 (des)
N/A 1.0E-01 (asc) 1.0E-01 (asc)
2/6 Leaks 3.0E-01 (des) 3.0E-01 (des)
6.0E-02 (asc) 1.4E-01 (asc)
2.2E-01 (des) 3.8E-01 (des)
N/A 1.890E-04/hr 1.152E-04/hr 2.224E-05/hr 5.971E-04/hr
N/A 2.8E-05
N/A 80E-03 (asc) 5.0E-03 (asc) 9.9E-04 (asc) 2.5E-02 (asc)
0/12 Leaks 7.0E-02 (des) 5.3E-02 (des) 1.4E-02 (des) 1.6E-01 (des)
N/A 1.0 (asc)
0.8333 (des)
N/A 1.0 (asc)
0.8333 (des)
N/A 1.0 (EL)
0.88 (TU)
N/A 0.99432/start 0.99555/start 0.99857/start 0.98806/start
N/A 6.962E-05 5.501E-05 1.974E-05 1.672E-04
N/A 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.19 \
Table 9.3-I: Posterior Probability Distributions
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9.4 APU/HYD/WSB ANALYSIS FOR SSME MODEL
The APU failure probability assessment for the SSME model being produced at SAIC is some-
what different than that for this APU model. First, the exposure time is at most 520 seconds in-
stead of 20 minutes Second, only 1 of the WSB failures is relevant (STS-3) for purposes of
calculating engine hydraulic lockup probability.
We started with the prior distribution for IF, given in Table 92-6, multiplied against the 520 sec-
ond time period to produce a probability of failure (POF). We updated with I failure in 63 mis-
sions to produce a posterior This represents the case in which the WSB failure and APU
shutdown continues to be representative of how MCC and crew will react to a WSB failure Since
STS-3, other WSB failures have not resulted in a call for APU shutdown before MECO. Flight
Rules indicate that APU shutdowns should occur post-MECO.
We also updated the same prior distribution for IF with 0 failures in 63 missions. This is like say-
ing that STS-3 never happened and gives an overly optimistic assessment. An accurate assess-
ment lies somewhere in between. We used a weighted average of each posterior where each
update was given equal probability of being the correct one.
The Bayesian calculation is shown in Figure 9.4.1.
The MGL method was used to calculate the probability of loss of hydraulics for a single engine
and for two engines as follows:
1 Engine Goes into Hydraulic Lockup via Hydraulic Failure During Ascent
Q = 3(1- _)qAP_, = 3 (1-0.1) i.5E-04 = 4E-04
2 Engines Go into Hydraulic Lookup via Hydraulic Failure During Ascent (First 5.6 minutes)
Q = 3/2 (1-),)[_(3.36/520)q_t +3(1-13):(336/520) -"c/Z_u =
3/2(1-0.27)0.1 (336/520) 1.5E-04+3(1-0.1)2 (336/520)-" 1.5E-04 = IE-04
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0.05 -
0.04 -
003-
0.02 +
i
0.01 *_
I
'l
0]--
5.00E-05 1 43E-03
BAYESIAN UPDATE-E Template
SafeO., Factor Associates, Inc.
i
-- _or _[ PARAMETERS
Pro_abilirv JlOr'a5.1 _;.5 failures
- Lpdatod J[ - "189;time/trials
Probability
2 80E._)3 4 18E-03 5.55E-03
Frequency
693E-03
f Buttons
PRIOR UPDATE
Mean 1.330E-O3
Median 1.041E-03
Mode 6.693E-04
5th °o 3321E-04
20th % 5.805E-04
80th % 1.864E-03
95th °o
(5
3.250E-O3
9.472E-O4
I 464E-03
1 159E-03
7 381E-04
3 646E-O4
6.452E-04
2.053E-O3
3.449E-03
1.005E-03
Figure 9.4-1: APU Failures on Ascent Causing SSME Hydraulic Lockup (POF)
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